Audit for the Requirements for the TRAILBLAZER And THINTHREAD Systems

Below is an unfinished transcription of the US Deparment of Defense audit of the NSA Trailblazer program.

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Report 05-INTEL-03
December 15, 2004
Audit Report

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Requirements for the TRAILBLAZER And THINTHREAD Systems (U//FOUO)

Special Warning

This document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. This report contains certain unclassified information relating to the organization and function of the National Security Agency that may be protected by the National Securit Act of 1959, as amended (50 United States Code § 402 (note)). Reproduction or removal of pages is prohibited. Safeguards must be taken to prevent publication or improer disclosure of the information in this report.

DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52
DATED: 23 November 2004
DECLASSIFY ON: 20291123

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Additional Copies (U)

(U To obtain copies of the report, contact Mr. Thomas F. Gimble at
(703) 604-8800 (DSN 664-8800), █████████████ at (703) 604 ████ (DSN
664-████), or ██████████████ at (410) 854-████

Suggestions for Audits (U)

(U) To suggest ideas for or to request future audits or evaluations of Defense
intelligence issues, contact the Office of the Deputy Inspecotr General for
Intelligence at (703) 604-880 (DSN 664-8800) or fax (703) 604-0045. Ideas and
requests can also be mailed to:

(U)
Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
Attn: Executive Officer
Inspector General of the Department of Defense
400 Army Navy Drive (Room 703)
Arlington, VA 22202-4704

(U)
Defense Hotline (U)

(U) To report fraud, waste, or abuse, contact the Defense Hotline by calling
(800) 424-9098; by sending an electronic message to Hotline dodig.osd.mil; or
writing the Defense Hotline, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1900. The
identity of each writer and caller is fully protected.

Acronym (U)

(U) NSA/CSS National Securit Agency / Central Security Service

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Per DoD IG



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Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense

Report No. 05-INTEL-03
(Project No. D2003AL-0100)
December 15, 2005

Requirements for the TRAILBLAZER and THINTHREAD Systems (U)

Executive Summary (U)

(U//FOUO) (U) Who Should Read This Report And Why? Acquisition decision makers at the
National Security Agency (NSA); the designated NSA Milestone Decision Authority for
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and
personnel in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information
Integration) should read this report. █████████████████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████████████████████████ (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
the NSA.

(U//FOUO) Background. We performed this audit in response to a Defense Hotline
complaint, which alleged that NSA actions in the development of THINTHREAD and
TRAILBLAZER result in fraud, waste, and abuse. The specific allegations were: (1)
TRAILBLAZER development wasted ██████████████████ (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 dollars; (2) NSA
disregarded solutions to urgent U.S. national securit needs; (3) NSA modified or
suppressed studies ██████████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
and (4) NSA did not ███████████████████████████████████████████
████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 THINTHREAD.

(S//SI) THINTHREAD, ██████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) TRAILBLAZER. TRAILBLAZER is an Acquisition Category-IA program
to acquire, through a series of spiral developments, an integrated system to provide the
much-needed mission capability against the Global Network. ████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████ (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 TRAILBLAZER is being
developed. See Appendix B for further details.

(U//FOUO) █████████████████████████████████████
███████████████████████████████████████████████
███████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



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(U//FOUO) █████████████████████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(C) Results. NSA enhanced existing digital network exploitation systems, ████████████
██████████████████████████████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████████████████████████████the National Security
Agency is inefficiently using resources to develop a digital network exploitation system
that is not capable of fully exploiting the digital network intelligence aviailable to analysts
from the Global Information Network. NSA should ████████████████████████████████
███████████████████████████
███████████████████████████
███████████████████████████
███████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) NSA mangement ████████████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 digital network exploitation for the TRAILBLAZER ███████████████
██████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 Technology Demonstration Platform ██████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
As a result, the NSA transofmration effort may be developing a less capable long-term
digital network exploitation solution that will take longer and cost significantly more to
develop. NSA mangement should designate a team to assess ████████████████
███████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
the processing and exploitation requirements of the TRAILBLAZER Technology Demonstration Platform.
Also, NSA mangement should provide the results of this assessment to the
TRAILBLAZER Technology Demonstration Platform Milestone Decision Authority for
use in making the Milestone B decision. █████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

(U) Mangement Comments and Audit Response. The management comments from
the Director, NSA/Chief, Central Security Service contained significant disagreements
with the report findings. The Director stated that the world's most advanced cryptologic
experts have assessed the situation and are confident in the approach NSA has taken. The
Director nonconcurred with the recommendation ███████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5) The Director
concurred or partially concurred with the recommendations to █████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)
and include this assessment as part of the TRAILBLAZER Milestone B decision. The
Program Executive Officer and TRAILBLAZER management will estimate the
cost/schedule impacts after they receive estimates from the review team and will decide
at that time whether to concur. Three of the four partial concurrences depend upon the
Program Executive Officer and TRAILBLAZER management decision ████████████████ █████████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

U//FOUO
(U) We revised the report findings and recommendations based on the Director's
comments. However we continue to believe ██████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5) We request that the NSA/Chief, Central Security Service provide █████████████████████████
█████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5) We do not agree with management that it would be detrimental to the
signals intelligence mission ███████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

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(U) █████████████████████████████████████████████ (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 We request that the Director, NSA/Chief, Central Security Service provide additional comments to this report by
January 15, 2005. See the Findings section of the report for a discussion of management
comments and audit responses, Appendix J for a detailed audit response to the
management comments, and the mangement comments section of the report for the
complete text of the comments

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Report Table of Contents


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Table of Contents (U)


(U//FOUO)

Executive Summary i

Background 1

Objectives 3

Findings
A. █████████████████████████████████████(b)(3) P.L. 86-36 4
B. The NSA Transformation 27

Appendixes
A. Scope and Methodology 38
Prior Coverage 39
B. TRAILBLAZER 40
C. █████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3) P.L. 86-36 42
D. █████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3) P.L. 86-3655
E. THINTHREAD 58
F. Technical Studies 62
G. ██████████████████(b)(3) P.L. 86-36 73
H. █████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3) P.L. 86-36 82
I. Glossary 88
J. Audit Response to Management Comments 95
K. Report Distribution 113

National Security Agency, Central Security Agency Comments 114

(U//FOUO)

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(U) Background

(C) Hotline Allegations. A letter to the Defense Hotline requested that the
Inspector General of the Department of Defense audit and investigate the
acquisition of the TRAILBLAZER and THINTHREAD programs. The complaint
charged the NSA with fraud, waste, abuse, and a disregard for a solution to urgent
security needs because the TRAILBLAZER Program █████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3) P.L. 86-36 Also, the
NSA ignored or modified the recommendations of two technology studies ██████
███████████████████████████████████████████
███████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3) P.L. 86-36

(U) National Security Agency Mission and Planning Guidance. The mission
of the National Security Agency / Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) is to
provide actionable Signals Intelligence to U.S. decisionmakers, from the national
to the tactical level, while protecting the nation's vital information from attacks.
The urgency of the NSA / CSS mission is greater than ever since the September
11th attacks and the Global War on Terrorism.

(U//FOUO) In addition, defense planning guidance and the Director of Central
Intelligence guidance stipulate the need for "a globally vigilant intelligence
system that can provide early strategic warning of risis and detect threats" that is
supported by capabilities such as "information superiority backbone."

(S//SI) TRAILBLAZER is a ███████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3) P.L. 86-36 major acquisition program, which
started in FY 2000 and is scheduled for initial operating capability in FY 2009, to
acquire an integrated system that is composed largely of commercial technology
to provide the mcuh-needed missio ncapability against the global network through
a series of spiral developments. The TRAILBLAZER system will deliver
hardware and software, systems integration, and program integration services to
include:

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██████████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3) P.L. 86-36

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(C) THINTHREAD ████████████████████████████████████████████████
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██████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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██████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U) Policy Governing ███████████████████████ (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 Acquisition. Guidance for
DoD Instruction 5000.2, and the Clinger Cohen Act of 1996. Specifically, these
regulations provide the framework for the acquisition of major automated
information systems.

(U) DoD Directive 5000.1, "The Defense Acquisition System," May 12, 2003.
DoD Directive 5000.1 establishes the management process by which the DoD
provides effective, affordable, and timely systems to the users. DoD
Directive 5000.1 states that all acquisition professionals shall continuously
develop and implement initiatives to streamline and improve the Defense
Acquistion System. Specifically, this directive states that military decision
authorities and program managers shall examine and, as appropriate, adopt
innovative practices that reduce cycle time and cost and encourage teamwork.

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(U) DoD Instruction 5000.2, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,"
May 12, 2003. DoD Instruction 5000.2 establishes a management framework for
translatig mission requirements into stable, affordable, and well managed
acquisition programs that include weapon systems and automated information
systems, and highly sensitive classified, cryptologic, and intelligence projects and
programs. Instruction 5000.2 states that, during the initial concept design, DoD
Components should examine multiple concepts and material approaches to
optimize the way that DoD provides these capabilities. That approach shall
include robust analyses that consider affordability, technology maturity, and
responsivenesss.

(U) Clinger-Cohen (Information Technology Management Reform) Act of
1996. This act requires that heads of executive agencies develop and use best
practices in the acquisition of information technology. The process of an
executive agency shall include minimum criteria to be applied in considering
whether to undertake a particular investment in information systems, including
criteria related to the quantitatively expressed projected net, risk-adjusted return
on investment and specific quantitative and qualitative criteria for comparing and
prioritizing alternative information sytems investment projects.

(U) NSA/CSS Circular 5000R, "Acquisition Management," January 9, 2001.
The circular implements the principles of DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD
Regulation 5000.2-R within the NSA/CSS. It establishes basic objectives,
policies, procedures, and responsibilities for acquisition management. The
circular states that for acquisition management within the Defense Cryptologic
Program, NSA should address interoperability between existing and future
Service tactical Signals Intelligence systems, connectivity between tactical and
national systems, consider applicable technology that may satisfy the requirement,
and possible duplication ofongoing effort.

(U) Objectives

(U//FOUO) The overall audit objective was to evaluate ██████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 We
did not review the management control program See Appendix A for a
discussion of the scope and methodology.

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THINTHREAD

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█████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3) P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) TRAILBLAZER ████████████████████████████████████
███████████████████(b)(3) P.L. 86-36

(TS//SI) The TRAILBLAZER ███████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L 86-36 an initiative that
began in March 2001 at a cost of approximately ███████████████████████(b1)(1) (b)(3)-P.L 86-36 focused on a set of
efforts to demonstrate essential capabilitie and establish an initial Operational
Capability by June 2002 that would lead the transformation of the NSA into an era of
effective and efficient digital network exploitation. The immediate objective of
the TRAILBLAZER ██████████████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L 86-
36

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(U//FOUO) Technical Review Studies. A number of internal and external technical
review studies were conducted to determine ███████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3) P.L. 86-36

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(U) Internal Reviews

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(U//FOUO) Results of the Technical Review. The technical review concluded
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(U//FOUO) █████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3) P.L. 86-36 (b)(5) conclusions and recommended that:
* (U//FOUO) █████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3) P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)
█████████████████████████████████████████████
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(U) External Reviews

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* (U//FOUO) █████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3) P.L. 86-36
* (U//FOUO █████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3) P.L. 86-36

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(U//FOUO) Recommendations ████████████████████████████████████████
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*(U//FOUO) ███████████████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████(b)(5) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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█████████████████████████████████████ (b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(S//SI//REL) Recommendation: █████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

(S//SI) NSA Modernization Studies. The first "NSA Modernization Study,"
July 2001, was conducted by The National Technology Alliance, National Center
for Applied Technology after a thorough review of ongoing activities within the
TRAILBLAZER Program Management Office ███████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████
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(U) The NSA Modernization Study recommended that:
*(U//FOUO) ██████████████████████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)
*(U//FOUO) ██████████████████████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)
*(U//FOUO) ██████████████████████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

(U//FOUO) The National Center for Applied Technology issued a second report,
a "quick-look" follow-on to the first report, in December 2001. The Chief,
Signals Intelligence Programs invited the original study team to conduct a follow-
onD study to evaluate progress within the TRAILBLAZER Program Management
Office. Despite noting some changes made in NSA management and the
TRAILBLAZER Program's acquisition strategy that promised to address the
conflicts and issues noted in the first report, the study team found that:

*███████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
*███████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

██████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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██████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 THINTHREAD

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█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3) P.L. 86-36

(TS//SI) Studies. Prior to THINTHREAD deployment, the Technology Test and
Evaluation Assessment, March 25, 2002, advised that the following ████████████████████
█████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5) actions be addressed:

* ███████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

* (U) Generate user, system, technical, and programmatic documentation;

* █████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

* (U) Acquire sufficient numbers of appropriately skilled personnel to
develop documentation █████████████████████████████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

██████████████████████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████████████████████
██████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)




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█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3) P.L. 86-36

(U) Summary

█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3) P.L. 86-36

(U) Management Comments on the Finding and Audit
Response

(U//FOUO) Management Comments. The NSA management stated that the
draft report did not include significant information or included wrong or
misleading information. The complete list of management comments is in the
Management Comments section of this report.

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(U//FOUO) Audit Response. We obtained, reviewed, and analyzed many
documents and we interviewed several NSA and contractor personnel to form the
conclusions in this report. We included all information relevant to support the
report findings and recommendations. Many people we interviewed asked not to
be identified for fear of management reprisal. We gathered information from
many sources to support the finding. Paragraphs frequently contain information
from several sources to reinforce conclusions. Based on management comments,
we made various editorial changes to the draft report. See Appendix J for a
complete audit response to each management comment.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Audit
Response

█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

(U) A. We recommend that the Director, National Security Agency/Chief,
Central Security Service:

█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

(S//SI) Management Comments. The Director, National Security Agency/Chief,
Central Security Service nonconcurred and stated that the systems engineering

█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

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█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

(S//SI) Management Comments. The Director, National Security Agency/Chief,
Central Security Service nonconcurred because the National Security Agency
management believes that ████████████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████████
███████████████████Management did not understand what was meant by █████████
████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

(S//SI) Audit Response. Based on management comments, we revised the
recommendation to explain more clearly the meaning ██████████████████
████████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████████████████

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(TS//SI) that the National Security Agency management reconsider its position
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3) P.L. 86-36

3. (C) █████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3) P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) Management Comments. The Director, National Security
Agency / Chief Central Security Service concurred. In April 2003, NSA provided
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3) P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) (C) Audit Response. Management comments were partially responsive
Although the National Security Agency █████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3) P.L. 86-36


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B. The NSA Transformation (U)

(U//FOUO) █████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U) Congressional Concerns on Digital Network Exploitation

(U) The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2002 stated that:

(TS//SI) The NSA has clearly made great strides in seeking to
transform itself in many areas. However, the NSA appears to have
made only modest progress in the area most important to its future:
acquiring the technical ability to operate effectively against the
emerging global network. The NSA has long known that
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

(U) TRAILBLAZER

(S//SI) On March 24, 2000, the Director, NSA signed the TRAILBLAZER 1
charter to create a new Signals Intelligence enterprise to exploit the global
network. TRAILBLAZER 1, with an estimated development cost of
approximately ████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5) was to respond to the opportunities and challenges
provided by emerging technologies to design new operational practices for on-
time delivery of products and service in the manner that best met customer


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(S//SI) needs - unrestrained by past practices or past technologies.
TRAILBLAZER 1 had the following key responsibilities

*(U//FOUO) Ensure the execution of a new NSA program transforming
the U.S. Cryptologic System exploitation of the global network. Map
detailed digital network exploitation mission requirements to a
cryptologic architecture and implement them; and

*(U//FOUO) Act as the catalyst for transforming customer interaction
and operational practices. Begin the retooling of NSA
programmatically, technologically, and culturally to provide mission
service and capabilities that are responsive to the emerging
technolog and customer needs.

(U) ████████████████ (b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5) TRAILBLAZER

█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

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*(U//FOUO) ██████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

(U) NSA Modernization Studies

(C) First NSA Modernization Study. The House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence directed the first "NSA Modernization Study," July 2001, which
was conducted by The National Technolog Alliance, National Center for
Applied Technology. After a thorough review of ongoing activities within the
TRAILBLAZER Program Management Office █████████████████████████████████████
█████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5) and interviews with key program personnel, the National Center for
Applied Technolog team observed that the TRAILBLAZER was poorly
executed and had an overly expensive █████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)
The NSA Modernization Study recommended that:

█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

(S//SI) Second NSA Modernization Study. A second National Center for
Applied Technology report, a "quick-look" follow-on report, was completed in
December 2001. The Chief, Signals Intelligence Programs invited the original
study team to conduct a follow-on study to evaluate progress within the
TRAILBLAZER Program Management Office. Despite noting some changes
made in NSA management and the TRAILBLAZER Program acquisition strategy
that promsed to address the conflicts and issues noted in the first report, the study
team found that:

█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

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█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3) P.L. 86-36

(U) NSA Technical Reviews

(S//SI) During FY 2001, NSA initial and followup internal technical reviews
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U) TRAILBLAZER Acquisition

█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
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█████████████████████████████████████████████
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(U) Conclusion

(S//SI) TRAILBLAZER was developed to create a new Signals Intelligence
enterprise to exploit the global network ████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U) Summary of Management Comments on the Audit Finding
and Audit Response

(U//FOUO) Management Comments. NSA management referred to several
statements in the report that did not include all referenced documents and that
some paragraphs contained wrong or misleading information. The complete list
of management comments is located in the Management Comments section of
this report.

(U//FOUO) Audit Response. We obtained, reviewed, and analyzed many
documents to form the basis for the conclusions in this report. We also
interviewed several NSA and contractor personnel, many of whom asked not to
be identified for fear of management reprisal. We gathered information from
many sources to support the finding. Paragraphs frequently contain information
from several sources to reinforce conclusions. See Appendix J for a complete
audit response to each management comment.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Audit
Response

(C) Revised Recommendation. As a result of management comments, we
revised Recommendations B.1 and B.3 to clarify the intended use of
█████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

1. (U//FOUO) We recommend that the Director, National Security
Agency/Chief, Central Security Service:

*(C) Designate a team to assess █████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(5)

(U//FOUO) Management Comments. The Director, National Security
Agency/Chief, Central Security Service partially concurred with the internet of the
recommendation but was waiting for the results of a cost and schedule impact
study before fully concurring. The Program Executive Office is establishing an

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(U//FOUO) independent review team to complete the study before Milestone B,
scheduled for December 2004, because the study will have an effect on both the
cost and schedule for Milestone B.

█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(C) Audit Response. Based on management comments, we revised this
recommendation. The Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central
Security Service comments were responsive and the proposed actions meet the
intent of the recommendtation. The immediate actions taken to designate an
independent review team to perform the assessment are commendable.
Milestone B has slipped to February 2005 at the earliest: therefore NSA will have
time to complete the assessment ███████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
TRAILBLAZER. We request that the Director, National Security Agency/Chief,
Central Security Service provide a risk mitigation plan for cost and schedule
requirements and provide comments on a final concurrence.

2. (U//FOUO) Provide the results of the external assessment to the
TRAILBLAZER Technology Demonstration Platform Milestone Decision
Authority for use in making the Milestone B decision.

(U//FOUO) Management Comments. The Director, National Security
Agency/Chief, Central Security Service concurred. The completion ofthe
independent assessment is currently scheduled fer December 2004.

(U//FOUO) Audit Response. Although the Director, National Security
Agency/Chief, Central Security Service concurred, the concurrence is based on
completing the assessment requested in Recommendation B.1. We request that
the National Security Agency management provide additional comments in
response to the final report identifying NSA plans to eliminate the cost and
schedule risks for completing the assessment.

█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) Management Comments. The Director, National Security
Agency/Chief, Central Security Service concurred, and stated that the assessment
required in Recommendation B.1 will be included in the ██████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
for Milestone B, scheduled for December 2004.

(S//SI) Audit Response. Although the Director, National Security Agency/Chief,
Central Security Service concurred, the concurrence is based on completing the
assessment requested in Recommendation B.1. Based on management comments
to Recommendation B.2., this recommendation was revised ██████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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(S//SI) ██████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 We request additional
comments in response to the final report identifying NSA plans to eliminate the
cost and schedule risks for completing the assessment.

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Appendix A. Scope and Methodology (U)

(U//FOUO) We reviewed documentation dating from November 2000 through
October 2003 including background information, mission and operational need
statements, concepts and operational requirements, and contracting and budget
documents. Also, we conducted interviews with program managers, analysts, and
technicians responsible for the acquisition █████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3) P.L. 86-36

(U) We performed this audit from April 2003 through May 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

(U//FOUO) Limitation to Scope. Because our objective was limited to
evaluating a Defense Hotline allegation relating to the acquisition of the
TRAILBLAZER and THINTHREAD programs, we did not review the
management control program. █████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3) P.L. 86-36

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not use computer-processed
data to perform this audit.

(U//FOUO) Use of Technical Assistance. Audit Follow-up and Technical
Support Personnel assisted us during the audit. The Technical Assessment
Division assisted in the analysis of NSA acquisition █████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3) P.L. 86-36

(U) General Accounting Office High-Risk Area. The General Accounting
Office has identified several high-risk areas in DoD. This report provides
coverage of the Infrastructure Inefficiences and Information Technology
Investments high-risk areas.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U//FOUO) During the last 5 years, the Inspector General of the NSA issued one
report on TRAILBLAZER that dicsussed improperly based contract cost
increases, non-conformance in the management of the Statement of Work, and
excessive labor rates for contractor personnel. No prior coverage has been
conducted on the NSA THINTHREAD Program during the last 5 years.

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(U) Inspector General, NSA

(U//FOUO) Report No. ST-03-0014, "TRAILBLAZER 1/SIGINT Programs
Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance Contract," September 30, 2004







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Appendix B. TRAILBLAZER (U)

█████████████████████████████████████████████
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█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L.

(U) Objectives of TRAILBLAZER and the Technical
Demonstration Platform

█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
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█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
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█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

*(U//FOUO) Common standards and interfaces throughout the NSA
Reference Model.

█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(S//SI) Specifically, the TRAILBLAZER framework must leverage the best
commercial technology and practices. It also must be standards based to
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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Appendix C.

(U//FOUO)

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(U) Technical Recommendations

(U) The Tiger Team made the following recommendation.

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Appendix E. THINTHREAD (U)

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Appendix F. Technical Studies (U)

(U//FOUO) █████████████████████████████████████(b)(3) P.L. 86-36 THINTHREAD
Technical Review

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(U//FOUO) Summary of Study Recommendations. The following is complete
list of recommendations of the ██████████████████(b)(3) P.L. 86-36 THINTHREAD
Technical Review:

█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
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█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(3) P.L. 86-36

█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U) NSA Modernization Follow-Up Study

(S//SI) The "NSA Modernization Study," July 13, 2001, and the "NSA
Modernization Follow Up Study," December 2001, stated █████████████
█████████████████████████████████████████████
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how many times can you violate the Espionage Act in 5 minutes?

Note! If you are in the diplomatic service or a student of a foreign service school, do not read this web page! You could be thrown out of your program and/or fired from your job and/or lose your security clearance. Actually, even if you are just an ordinary person, this page contains information under which other people have been charged under Computer Espioange law for disclosing. Even though mainstream newspapers have published it, just be warned!



Bradley Manning is under a lot of charges. 34 if I remember correctly, from the two charge sheets the Army released. The first part of this article is about 3 of them. They are the charges related specifically to the July 12 2007 Baghdad Video, which would later allegedly become the Collateral Murder video on Wikileaks. It shows a portion of a battle operation where a Reuters journalist get killed by a US helicopter, as well as a civilian in a van who comes to help the wounded.

Manning is under indictment for releasing this video, it is on his charge sheet. One count under the Espionage Act subparagraph 793 e, and two counts under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act - (a)(1) being Computer Espionage and (a)(2) being Unauthorized Access. Of course it must be pointed out that technically, Manning has not been revealed as the source for Wikileaks' video, but it is kind of an odd coincidence that three (if not more) of the specific charges against him are specifically for an unnamed video from the same time, date, and place, covering the same subject matter.

But the biggest problem with this set of charges is that you can go on youtube and find videos very similar to it. They are all over the place. If you read enough of the stories written about Manning, you will find out that this 'secure facility' he went to was frequented by people who downloaded these types of videos for entertainment purposes.

Do this search on youtube:

gun camera footage insurgents

There are about 94 results. This doesn't, of course, include all the other similar videos with different titles.

Like this,

"Iraq/Afghanistan - Air Combat Compilation.

, which comes complete with a Metallica soundtrack. I don't know how James Hetfield feels about that.

One of the videos had a 'watermark' showing us where the video came from.

ApacheClips.com

And what, pray tell, is Apache Clips Dot Com? It is a website full of hundreds and hundreds of gun camera footage videos. That's right, they charged Bradley Manning with the Espionage Act for giving out a video that is the same kind of video that the ApacheClips.com crew have been putting up for entertainment, therapy, trophies, morbid fascination, or whatever else you want to call it, by the hundreds. (By the way: if you are wondering why it's called Apache Clips - Apache is a sort of attack helicopter commonly used in Iraq and Afghanistan, and their gun cameras are responsible for a lot of the footage aforementioned. Of course, Apache is also the name of an Indian tribe; that is a long story for another time.)

The problem with the comparison of Manning and Apacheclips.com is that Manning actively gave out the video - whereas ApacheClips presumably simply posts videos it finds through innocent means. Thus the groups (ApacheClips, Youtube, Youtube's users) presenting these videos on the web are equivalent of the New York Times or other media outlets, which are traditionally protected against Espionage prosecutions if they were not directly involved in the allegedly illegal acts committed to obtain the information in the first place. I.E. having the information itself is not traditionally illegal, receiving it isn't either. Only actively helping to smuggle out the information was typically considered prosecutable. That was out of habit and tradition.

Tradition has changed though. Obama's administration is trying to prosecute people in Cambridge Massachusettes right now for the Espionage Act subparagraph (g) (conspiracy) for helping Wikileaks. Probably. It's a Grand Jury, so most of the details are secret, but Glenn Greenwald has posted the public Grand Jury subpoenas online. In a separate case that further violates the tradition, Obama's Department of Justice is ubpoenaing a reporter, James Risen and threatening to put him in jail if he doesn't reveal his source for a book "State of War". So the old journalistic presumptions of safety-from-prosecution are not really with us in our modern era.

So. Technically, is Apacheclips not possibly in the same boat, legally, as Wikileaks? And are the people involved with Apache Clips sourcing not in the same boat as the Wikileaks people in Cambridge? And are the sources for the Apache Clips video not in the same legal boat as private Manning?

This leads one to ask: who exactly runs ApacheClips.com? If you click on 'About Us', it says it is Shock and Awe Productions. Great. What about a WHOIS search?

Current Registrar: PSI-USA, INC. DBA DOMAIN ROBOT

[owner-c] fname: Nico
[owner-c] lname: Richters
[owner-c] org: Planlos
[owner-c] address: Blackhallsquare
[owner-c] city: Dublin
[owner-c] pcode: 03
[owner-c] country: IE
[owner-c] state: IE

Ireland?

Registered with regfish.com, a German site.

Who is Nico Richters?

"My name is Nico Richters, I am 32 years old German (that should explain my crappy English), not married (yet) living in "sunny" Dublin/Ireland. My main interests in this life have to be Web designing (especially the creation of Communities) and Bodybuilding."

nico-richters.zoints.com

Uhmm. ok.

Myspace: Someone named 'Apache Stark' also goes by Nico Richters.

link

OK.

Here is a 10 page discussion board thread about "Stark" aka "Nico Richters" having trouble keeping up ApacheClips.com

link to getbig.com

OK.

Those are not exactly 'reliable sources' - myspace, a discussion boards, WHOIS, but it doesn't seem like an extraordinary speculation to say that Nico Richters is responsible for ApacheClips.com.

Nico Richters, a German man living in Ireland runs a website with a bunch of gun-camera footage from American helicopters in a war/contingency-operation in Afghanistan and another war/contingency-operation in Iraq. The sources for his videos are unknown.

Contrast with Julian Assange, an Australian man living in Sweden / The UK / Iceland / Wherever, who runs a website with a single piece of gun-camera footage from the same sorts of American helicopters in the same wars/contingency operations, doing basically the same thing. The sources for his videos are also unknown.

What is the difference?

In the latter case, one of the alleged sources for the video, and several others probably involved with the transmission of the video, are under Espionage Act charges.

I somehow doubt that Richters and his band of followers will ever face anything like what Manning and the Wikileaks people in Cambridge are facing... even though he has done the same thing they did, a thousand times over.

Thus. The three charges against Manning over this July 2007 Baghdad Video are questionable. If it were in a civilian court, with a civilian jury, I have to wonder if the jury would be persuaded to convict. Manning, though, is not in a civilian court - he will be tried in a military court. This is rather irksome, considering that he was crawled up in a fetal position a few months before they forced him to deploy to Forward Operating Base Hammer, where he allegedly performed his deeds.

Nevertheless. These Baghdad Video charges against Manning do not "pass the smell test", to borrow a phrase from Richard Bennett, the judge in the Thomas Drake case. That is three charges out of 34 against Manning, that are apparently on an incredibly weak legal foundation. And if the Cambridge people are charged in relation to that video, for conspiracy, then those specific charges are also perhaps incredibly weak - and those Cambridge people will be tried in a civilian courtroom (if they come to trial).

Lastly, let's compare the contents of the two videos and the nature of the charges. The government is arguing that the clip contained important "national defense information". That is the standard of the Espionage Act 793(e). Not just 'classified' information, but "national defense information" that could harm the country or aid another country. Where, then, is the evidence that this video could harm the country or help another country?

It shows gun camera footage. As shown above, gun camera footage is all over the internet. In the Gulf War I, Norman Schwarzkopf himself had press conferences where such footage was used as a joke, and a room full of reporters laughed, watching little blurry dots of people running away from incoming bombs. So the fact that the video is of a gun camera doesn't seem to merit the 'national defense information' status.

It is footage if US troops mistakenly killing a reporter and some civilians engaged in medical relief work. Some people have pointed out this all happened close to a battle zone where US forces were engaged. This is not an uncommon thing to happen in wars. Does that make it 'national defense information'? How? What makes video of reporters and civilians accidentally getting killed any different from video of terrorists or enemy soldiers or combatants getting killed?

Is the government trying to argue that somehow the 'propaganda value' of the video for the enemy, in and of itself, makes it 'national defense information'? If that were true, then every single piece of evidence for any controversial incidents involving the military would then be considered 'secret' under the Espionage Act. The photo of the little girl running away from a burning village in Vietnam? Espionage. The Abu Grahib photos? Espionage. The picture of the South Vietnamese military officer shooting a man in the head? Espionage. Material related to the My Lai massacre? Espionage. Documentaries about Haditha? Espionage. The film "Restrepo"? Espionage. Saving Private Ryan? Espionage. All of these could be used as propaganda by the enemies of the United States. Thus, in the strict interpretations of the language of the law, they would be considered Espioange.

Then consider the people who have this material - civilians, journalists, reporters, military officers trying to tell their stories, historians, etc. All of these people would also be guilty of Espionage, under the Obama administration interpretation of the law.

Surely this slippery slope is an imaginatory paranoia? Such things will never come to pass, correct? I don't know, ask Thomas Drake, Diane Roark, Bill Binney, Ed Loomis, Kirk Wiebe, and others who have recently been charged with Espionage. The information they had was not even bloody footage of atrocities, it was criticism of an allegedly illegal government boondoggle. It did not endanger any troops in any way. And yet they were all raided by the FBI in relation to an Espionage case (They were not charged with any crimes, except Drake, but all of his charges were dropped, and he instead plead guilty to a misdemeanor).

This is the problem for the government in a civilian courtroom, with a civilian jury, with these July 2007 Baghdad video charges, in my humble opinion. Ordinary people are not insane, especially not when they are given the time and the resources to ponder over something and told that a man's future hangs in the balance. They don't believe that showing video of war's harsh reality is in the same category as Espionage. It doesn't reveal state secrets, except for the secret that is not a secret - that war is awful and innocent people get killed.

So. What else is hiding in those 34 charges against Bradley Manning? Are these three Baghdad Video charges just an anomaly? Are the rest of the charges against him good, solid charges about endangering the troops? Are they about documents that put people's lives directly at risk? Are the laws he is charged with breaking more clear in their language and in their case history?



Part Two. Iceland

There are three other charges against Manning for a very specific document; the Reykjavic 13 state department cable. What is in this cable? It actually has nothing to do with national defense, or the troops, or even Afghanistan or Iraq. None of the ordinary internet comments that decry Manning for endangering lives would appear to apply to this document; and yet he is being charged with it on three separate counts.

The only reason he can be charged at all for these documents is because of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act - sub paragraph (a)(1), Computer Espionage. How is that possible? Because the CFAA specifically contains the phrase "foreign relations". Unlike every other Espionage-type law, the CFAA outlaws giving out information related to the "foreign relations" of the US. The other Espionage Laws, such as the Espionage Act of 1917, use the phrase "national defense information". The the SIGINT statute of the Espionage Act applies only to certain types of classified information surrounding cryptography, and then only under certain circumstances. Things like intent and who the secrets were given to become important in old fashioned Espionage cases.

But the CFAA, created in the 1980s, has become, in an age where all information travels through computer, a sort of 'back-door' expansion of the Espionage Act to apply to all kinds of other information and situations that Congress never intended the original Espionage Act to apply to. The fact that it had to do with 'computers' probably allowed it to slip under the radar of those normally interested in protecting free speech - stick "Computer hacking" into an argument and certain people get all weak in the knees and lose their sense of perspective.

For more on why Congress traditionally has resisterd pushes to blanketly criminalize the disclosure of information, google around for Elsea's CRS report from early 2011, or the Edgar and Schmidt article from the 1973 Columbia Law journal. Congress likes giving information out to support it's own political viewpoints, and so does the president.

So, then, what exactly was in the Reykjavic 13 cable? What does Iceland have to do with anything important? Why does anyone even care? Well, it turns out that Iceland played a big part in the financial crisis of 2008. Icesave was one of the fraudulent "privatized" banks, which were propped up by certain corrupt intellectuals and academics, as displayed painfully well in the film "Inside Job" by Charles Ferguson. I.E. he interviews the academics directly and asks them what happened, and they have no good answers. Later on, the UK used anti-terrorism laws to seize assets from Iceland, claiming that it owed them money. Iceland's people would later tell the rest of the world to basically go shove it, and they are trying to rebuild their economy in the old fashioned manner to which they had become acustom before Icesave & the lot tried to bankrupt them for a generation. It is not the first time; a classic study of Iceland Versus The World cam be found in Halldor Laxness' "Atomstation", which was about the Americans building a nuclear bomber base on the island. But that's another story for another time.

So what is in the actual Reykjavic cable? This is an interesting contrast with the Thomas Drake case. Usually, the government tries to act like evidence at these National Security trials is so super secret, that the public cannot possibly see it or it would irreparably harm the entire nation. Thus, even the document that Drake was charged with that was marked UNCLASSIFIED in big bold letters has been held secret - we, the public, have no idea what was in it, and so we were left to wonder. This sort of thing only favors the government - making the defendant look bad by making the information they are accused with having seem super damaging.

But in the Manning case, we can actually see a lot of these documents. Reykjavik 13, for eaxmple, is easily downloadable (with a bittorrent program) from wikileaks.ch


And it follows:


01/13/2010

FM AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR SMART AND WINN, NSC FOR HOVENIER, DOD FOR FENTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2020
TAGS: ECON, EFIN, IC, PGOV, PREL
SUBJECT: LOOKING FOR ALTERNATIVES TO AN ICESAVE REFERENDUM

REF: REYKJAVIK 9

Classified By: CDA SAM WATSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

1. (C) Summary. CDA met with Ministry of Foreign Affairs Permanent
Secretary Einar Gunnarsson and Political Advisor Kristjan Guy Burgess
January 12 to discuss Icesave. After presenting a gloomy picture
of Iceland's future, the two officials asked for U.S. support. They
said that public comments of support from the U.S. or assistance in
getting the issue on the IMF agenda would be very much appreciated. They
further said that they did not want to see the matter go to a national
referendum and that they were exploring other options for resolving the
issue. The British Ambassador told CDA separately that he, as well as the
Ministry of Finance, were also looking at options that would forestall
a referendum. End Summary.

2. (C) CDA met with Permanent Secretary Einar Gunnarsson and Political
Advisor Kristjan Guy Burgess at the Icelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs
on January 12 for a two hour marathon meeting to discuss Icesave. The
Icelandic officials painted a very gloomy picture for Iceland's
future. They suggested that the most likely outcome for the country
was that the Icesave issue would fail in a national referendum. Should
that occur, they suggested, Iceland would be back to square one with
the British and the Dutch. The country, however, would be much worse
off because it would have lost international credibility and access to
financial markets. Gunnarsson suggested that the Icesave issue, if it
continues along its present course, would cause Iceland to default in 2011
when a number of loans become due and could set Iceland back 30 years.

3. (C) The two government officials stressed that Iceland needs
international support. CDA reiterated that the United States was neutral
on this bilateral issue and hoped for a speedy resolution. Moreover,
the U.S. had supported Iceland's position at the last IMF Review and
expected to do so again depending on the circumstances. Gunnarsson and
Burgess responded that they understood the United States' stated position
of neutrality on the issue; however, they expressed the view that it
was impossible to remain neutral regarding the Icesave matter. Iceland,
they said, was being bullied by two much larger powers and a position
of neutrality was tantamount to watching the bullying take place. They
suggested that a public statement from the U.S. in support of Iceland
would be very helpful. They also felt that U.S. intervention in the
IMF could be of assistance, specifically if it was targeted at getting
Iceland's review placed on the IMF agenda. Gunnarsson acknowledged that
U.S. support during the review was appreciated but, realistically,
the issue would never make it on the agenda unless external pressure
was applied on the IMF.

4. (C) Gunnarsson and Burgess were extremely pessimistic regarding
the national referendum and said that the Government of Iceland was
exploring other options to resolve the Icesave situation. They hinted
that renegotiation might be a viable alternative and referenced recent
meetings between the government and the opposition at which this option
was discussed. Everyone could potentially save face, they suggested,
if a new repayment agreement was reached with the British and Dutch that
could possibly include a lower interest rate for the loan. This solution,
they felt, would be palatable to the Icelandic people and potentially
to the opposition as well. They did not know, however, whether the
British and Dutch would agree to another round of negotiations. They
also acknowledged that any new agreement would have to be approved in
parliament and, of course, signed by the president.

5. (C) On January 13, CDA also discussed the situation with British
Ambassador Ian Whiting who said that Britain might consider options that
would forestall a national referendum on the Icesave issue. The Ambassador
said, however, that the British Government was receiving mixed messages
from the Icelanders who, one week ago, seemed content to move forward with
a referendum (as the Prime Minister had conveyed to her UK counterpart)
but now appeared to be looking at other options. For example, the Ministry
of Finance was already looking at ways to improve the agreement but not
undermine the obligation or certainty of payment. He outlined for CDA
a potential solution that he was exploring that would involve Norway
loaning Iceland the money to cover the Icesave debt. This idea, he felt,
had merit because it would create a situation in which the Icelandic
Government was dealing with a country that it perceived to be sympathetic
to its situation, a fact that could remove some of the animosity from the
renegotiations. Negotiating a good loan repayment agreement with Norway,
said Whiting, would allow both sides to claim victory. The British and
Dutch would receive their money and Iceland would be able to repay its
debts under more favorable terms. He was going to discuss the idea with
the Norwegian Ambassador that same day.

6. (C) On January 13, CDA also met Iceland's Ambassador to the United
States Hjalmar Hannesson who was in Iceland. The Ambassador described
the potential constitutional crisis that would likely ensue should the
referendum go forward and fail, in essence a vote of no confidence. In
that case, the constitutionally apolitical Head of State would have
brought down the elected government, a possibility that several former
politicians in both parties had long ago agreed should not happen. Despite
his and his family's long association with the Progressive Party,
Hannesson said that this was not the time for elections or a change of
government. He added that he did not sense a willingness on the part
of the opposition to take control of the government. Noting that the
President, whom he has known for years, is considered "unpredictable,"
he hoped that a solution palatable to all sides in Iceland could provide
a way out.

7. (C) Comment: It is quickly becoming clear that very few of the
involved parties are comfortable with the Icesave issue being put to
a vote in a national referendum. Both the ruling coalition and the
opposition appear to understand that they must present a united front
for there to be any possibility of discussing alternative solutions with
the British and Dutch. At present, such cooperation remains elusive;
however, a number of closed door meetings between the opposition and
government will take place in the coming days to explore the full range
of potential solutions and, hopefully, to forge consensus. All of this,
however, remains in flux. WATSON


That's it. That's what they are charging Manning with giving out; two counts of Computer Espionage and one count of Unauthorized Access. Potentially several years in prison for each count. When people say "Manning endangered the troops", this Icesave memo is what they are lumping in there with everything else he disclosed.

And now you have it on your computer too - technically, under a strict interpretation of the language of the law, you are now guilty too, just as guilty as him, and as the Wikileaks people who posted the information. Which is why I warned you at the top of the page not to read it. Of course I wouldn't be too worried - if you are going to jail, so is the New York Times and hundreds of thousands of it's readers.

On the other hand - if you think the government would never be so silly as to interpret the law that strictly - just ask people like Stephen Kim and Thomas Drake. They can tell you a different story.

So out of 34 counts against Manning, we have just seen that 6 of them are very very difficult to take seriously. That's in a few minutes of internet searching. How many of the other counts against him are equally flimsy?

We shall see.

Finis